INTRODUCTION
Deference doctrines involve the extent to which courts, in their interpretation of statutes and regulations, should be influenced by how the agencies charged with administering these authorities construe them. Deference doctrine has received enormous attention in case law 1 and commentary 2 during the past three decades, both in tax and in administrative law.
In Gonzales v. Oregon, 3 the Supreme Court identified three strands of deference doctrine: deference under Chevron, 4 deference under Skidmore/Mead, 5 and deference under Auer/Seminole Rock (hereinafter ASR). 6 The first and second strands have been well rehearsed in tax law.
the Tax Court and comparing it to the application of the principle in other courts.
This article has three parts. Part I describes ASR deference generally and sketches its vitality in federal and state courts. Part II addresses ASR deference in the Tax Court. It concludes that the Tax Court has been far less receptive to ASR deference than has the Supreme Court. Moreover, it demonstrates ways in which the Tax Court has blunted or deflected attempts to assert ASR, and it offers possible explanations for this behavior. Despite its frequent use, there are objections to ASR deference. Part III explores those objections and finds them to be powerful. Part III concludes that ASR deference is a dubious principle of law; and thus the Tax Court's reluctance about the rule reflects greater wisdom than the Supreme Court's enthusiasm for it.
I. ASR DEFERENCE GENERALLY

A. Origin and Prevalence of ASR Deference
Statutes are, of course, the principal source of federal tax law. 13 Yet provisions of the Internal Revenue Code often contain gaps which Congress has authorized the Department of the Treasury ("Treasury") to fill by way of regulations.
14 If properly promulgated and consistent with the statute, Treasury tax regulations typically have the force of law. 15 Yet even the regulations may be ambiguous in ways that are important to the resolution of ambiguous statutes.
Chevron and Skidmore/Mead address how much deference courts should give to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. ASR speaks to how much deference courts should accord agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations. Over 60 years ago, in Seminole Rock, the Supreme Court stated:
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words is in doubt. The intention of Congress . . . in some situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing between various constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. 16 Despite its appearance in Seminole Rock, this strand of deference is more often identified by reference to Auer, a 1997 case in which the Supreme Court taught that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is "controlling" unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with" the regulation. 17 Even before Auer, however, the Court stated that it was "well established that an agency's construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference." The Supreme Court has invoked the principle in numerous cases. 19 The lower federal courts have as well. 20 The appearance and strength of the principle varies among the states, but it has been recognized at one level of puissance or another in numerous state cases, both tax 21 and non-tax.
22
Adherence to ASR deference appears to be strongest in the U.S. Supreme Court. A considerable amount of empirical work has been conducted, studying the effects of the various standards of deference. To the extent they are comparable, 23 the studies suggest that different standards of review often lead to similar outcomes. A 2011 article analyzed ten studies. 24 It found that, with one exception, federal courts at all levels uphold agency actions about 70% of the time-regardless of whether the standard applied is Chevron, Skidmore, arbitrary-and-capricious, substantial evidence, or de novo. 25 The one exception is that the Supreme Court behaves extremely deferentially when reviewing agency interpretations of their own rules: upholding the agency about 91% of the time when it applies ASR. 26 A subsequent study, however, found that the federal district and circuit courts were less deferential: they upheld the agency about 76% of the time when applying ASR. 27 Statistics, however, do not always tell the whole story. By the numbers, ASR deference seems firmly established in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Yet, there have been rumblings of discontent from time to time. In a 1994 case, Justices Thomas, Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg criticized some of the underpinnings of the doctrine, although they did not repudiate it outright. 28 In a 1995 case, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas voiced concern about some consequences of applying the rule. 29 In a 2011 case, Justice Scalia expressed substantial doubt as to the wisdom of ASR and announced his willingness to reexamine whether it deserves continued support. 30 Yet the course of legal doctrine often depends on accidents of personal and institutional biography. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter are no longer on the Court. Justice Thomas authored a recent opinion for the Court reaffirming ASR, with Justice Ginsburg joining in that opinion. 31 Justice Scalia has not yet been presented with the vehicle through which he can act on his epiphany. Until a new tide of history rolls in, ASR deference remains established in the Supreme Court.
B. Exceptions to ASR Deference
Despite the above statistics, even the Supreme Court can avoid or reject ASR deference when it thinks that wisdom walks a different path. Consider the Court's 2005 Ballard decision. To make short a very long 27 Pierce & Weiss, supra note 12, at 519. 28 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 517 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg, JJ.). 29 Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 84, 91-102 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Souter and Thomas, JJ.). 30 Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2265-66 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that he has become "increasingly doubtful" of the validity of ASR deference, adding "We have not been asked to reconsider Auer in the present case. When we are, I will be receptive to doing so."). 31 Id.
story, 32 the issue was whether the Tax Court, in rendering its ultimate decision, had accorded sufficient deference to the findings of its special trial judge who had heard the case. The Supreme Court held that it had not and that the Tax Court had misapplied its own rules.
33
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Thomas, argued by analogy to ASR, noting that an agency's interpretation of its own rule receives "controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" and maintaining that the Tax Court's interpretation of its Rule at issue was reasonable. 34 The dissenters recognized, of course, that the Tax Court is a court, not an agency. 35 However, in point of principle, they saw "no reason why Seminole Rock deference does not extend to the Tax Court's interpretation of its own procedural rules."
36
The Ballard majority brushed this aside. It grudgingly acknowledged that "the Tax Court is not without leeway in interpreting its own rules," 37 a formulation that plainly is less emphatic than Auer or Seminole Rock. Without extensive analysis of those cases or any other cases of the lineindeed without even citation to any of them-and without questioning the court-to-agency analogy, the majority dismissed the Tax Court's view of the applicable Rule as being unreasonable.
38
Ballard reflects the fact that ASR deference, although strong, is not unlimited. The current status of the rule is marked by three recent cases: Chase Bank, 39 Talk America, 40 and SmithKline Beecham. 41 In these cases, 1 0 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . interpretation-and thus no need for deference to interpretation-if the regulation itself is clear. 49 Third, Auer counsels that deference is unwarranted when there is reason to believe that the agency's interpretation "does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question." 50 Suspicion on this score may arise from various circumstances: for instance, when the current interpretation appears to be merely a "convenient litigating position," 51 when the agency's current position appears to be a "post hoc rationalization advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack," 52 or when the current interpretation conflicts with the agency's prior interpretation of the same regulation. 53 However, the current significance of the last point-agency inconsistency-is less than clear. In contexts other than ASR, the importance of agency inconsistency has been discounted. 54 The 2011 Talk America case accorded ASR deference despite the novelty of an agency's reinterpretation of a longstanding regulation. 55 Beecham decision cited older law suggesting that inconsistency can thwart ASR deference. 56 Fourth, deference will be denied if the agency's position is not settled or is not an authoritative expression of the agency's position. 57 The modality by which the agency's position is set forth has been a controversial aspect of this exception. A position set out in published guidance, especially if it has gone through levels of review within the agency, stands a good chance of receiving deference. Courts have sometimes questioned whether deference is due to interpretations set out in informal announcement or in briefs. 58 However, the agency's position was set out in a brief in Auer 59 and, in recent cases, ASR deference has been given to agency positions expressed in litigating briefs or amicus briefs filed in the case. 60 Fifth, ASR deference is in part a function of the agency's special position: as drafter of the regulation, it presumably knows best what it meant to convey via the regulation. 61 Circumstances undercutting this rationale argue against deference. For instance, the Supreme Court rejected ASR deference when all the regulation did was to parrot or restate the language of the statute. 62 A number of tax regulations are "parroting regulations." 63 Sixth, the case for deference is particularly strong when the agency's interpretation was long known to, and relied upon by, the regulated community. 64 In its 2012 SmithKline Beecham decision, the Court borrowed from other administrative law contexts a principle that regulated parties are entitled to "fair warning" of the conduct that is required or prohibited by a regulation. 65 The Court concluded that this principle had been violated and denied ASR deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute. In reaching this result, the Court emphasized two facts: (1) 
A. Extent of Tax Court Deference
In the Tax Court, ASR claims do not succeed at anything like the 91% success rate they achieved in the Supreme Court-or even the 76% success 64 Tallman, 380 U.S. at 16-18. 65 It is difficult to say with absolute confidence precisely how many times the Tax Court has dealt with the ASR principle. In some cases, the court addressed what is in essence the rule without citing either Auer or Seminole Rock. 68 Two things can be said, however. First, the Tax Court has discussed the principle over at least a third of a century in a significant number of cases-enough that reliable conclusions can likely be drawn. Second, the frequency with which the court has addressed the ASR principle has been increasing, with many of the decisions coming in 2009 and later years. 69 
Early Cases
Southern Pacific was an early treatment of ASR by the Tax Court.
70
The relevant issue involved amortization of the cost of emergency facilities under § 168. To qualify for favorable treatment, the taxpayer was required to show that the federal Office of Defense Mobilization ("ODM") had duly issued a certificate confirming the necessity of the facility to the national defense. 71 In dispute was whether the taxpayer had obtained the certificate within the time limit imposed by ODM's regulations. 72 The IRS maintained that ODM's intent as to a timing limit was manifested in various ways, including the language of the certificate, statements made to Congress by ODM, correspondence, and testimony. 71 Id. at 534-36. 72 Id. at 537. 73 Id. at 538-39.
The Tax Court held, however, that "[n]one of the items . . . show that the ODM ever manifested an intent" as to a time limit as argued by the IRS. 74 In so doing, the court rejected the IRS's reliance on ASR. 75 Citing Udall v. Tallman, the Tax Court reasoned that:
[N]either the ODM nor any delegate agency ever published any rules specifically indicating what it expected in the way of promptness . . . . Nor were any communications ever addressed to any applicant advising as to what conduct would be considered reasonable under the prescribed rules. We believe it is a necessary corollary [of ASR deference] that, in order for an agency's interpretation to be binding in a given situation, it must be clearly made a matter of public record such that all affected parties are aware of it. 76 However, the Tax Court here was erecting a barrier far higher than one ever erected by the Supreme Court, in Tallman or subsequently. Tallman used the longstanding nature of the interpretation there at issue to deflect objections that the position unreasonably violated "detrimental reliance" interests.
77
Southern Pacific's statement that the agency's interpretation "must be clearly made a matter of public record such that all affected parties are aware of it" makes such notoriety a precondition for ASR deference-and a strong one. 78 Notoriety was a shield to protect the agency in Tallman but was converted by Southern Pacific into a sword to strike at the agency.
Contrast Southern Pacific to SmithKline Beecham, discussed above.
79
The Supreme Court case rejected ASR deference because there had been "a very lengthy period of conspicuous inaction" by the agency, reversal of which would have caused "potentially massive liability" for the taxpayer 74 Id. at 541. 75 The IRS was urging deference to interpretation of another agency's regulations, not its own regulations, but there is precedent for this sort of thing. E.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 109-14 (1992) (deferring to EPA interpretation of state pollution statute incorporated by reference into EPA regulations); Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1991) (deferring to Labor Department's interpretation of HEW regulations). for conduct occurring "well before" the reversal.
80 That situation-specific, extreme-circumstances exception to deference was instead rendered by the Tax Court as a blanket precondition to deference that the agency's position had previously been "clearly made a matter of public record such that all affected parties are aware of it." The receptivity of the Supreme Court to ASR deference contrasts sharply with the hostility of the Tax Court to such deference.
Fourteen years later, in CSI, the Tax Court again rejected ASR deference on the same ground. Citing Southern Pacific, the court stated that: "unless an agency's interpretation of a statute or a regulation is a matter of public record and is an interpretation upon which the public is entitled to rely when planning their affairs, it will not be accorded any special deference." 81 The court stressed that the interpretation of the regulation urged by the IRS had not been set out in any ruling, procedure, or practice published before the litigation. 82 Again, though, the Tax Court's formulation of the rule is more draconian than the Supreme Court's formulation, as to agency interpretations of both statutes and regulations. As to interpretations of statutes, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have sometimes accorded Chevron deference to agency positions not formally set out before the controversy at hand. 83 As to interpretations of regulations, this article has already noted that the Supreme Court granted ASR deference to agency positions set out in litigation or amicus briefs in Chase Bank, Talk America, and Auer itself.
84
In several cases between Southern Pacific and CSI, the Tax Court rejected ASR deference on a different ground. This article has illustrated that deference will not be accorded if the interpretation is plainly contrary 80 84 See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
to the regulation. 85 The 1993 case Phillips Petroleum involved the sourcing of sales income under Code § 863 and the "independent factory price" concept of longstanding regulations under § 863. The court acknowledged the ASR principle, but it rejected the IRS's interpretation of the regulations set out in a much later notice. The court found that the notice entailed "a plain misreading" of the regulation which "effectively reads its plain meaning out of [ what is essentially a legislative and administrative matter." 92 As noted above, the significance for ASR purposes of agency inconsistency is somewhat unsettled. 93 However, the suggestion that a changed position can be made effective only by amending the regulation in question is stricter than current doctrine requires.
The situation was not entirely bleak for the ASR principle, however. In a memorandum opinion in a 2006 gift tax case, Judge Laro invoked the principle as an alternative rationale. 94 The significance of this invocation is undercut, though, by the fact that the Tax Court views its memorandum opinions as having lesser precedential weight than its "regular" opinions. 96 but it was used by the majority as a weapon against the IRS, not for it. Lantz was one of a series of cases testing the validity of a regulation under § 6015(f). Section 6015 prescribes a two-year limitations period for spousal relief claims under its subsections (b) and (c), but it is silent as to a comparable period under subsection (f). 97 Treasury acted to fill the gaps, promulgating a regulation establishing a two-year limitations period under subsection (f).
98
The Tax Court repeatedly invalidated the regulation and was sometimes 92 85 T.C. at 282. 93 See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. Lantz was one of the cases of this line, but ASR was invoked in Lantz in an unusual way. In one of the dissents, 100 Judge Halpern argued in part that the rigor of the two-year limitations period was mitigated by the possibility of the IRS exercising discretion under the § 9100 regulations 101 to grant an extension of time for the filing of a claim. 102 The majority countered that both the IRS and the taxpayer agreed that § 9100 relief was unavailable. The majority accepted this mutual position, bolstering it by invoking ASR deference to the IRS's view of the § 9100 regulations. t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 1 2 0 1 If the majority's view of ASR was tepid, Judge Halpern's was positively hostile. He continued to press the "no deference without published guidance" argument despite the fact that the Supreme Court, twelve years earlier in Auer, had accorded deference to a position in an agency brief. 106 And he merely asserted without explanation, reasoning, or authority his view that the IRS's interpretation of the § 9100 regulations was without merit. A standard as high as "plainly erroneous" clearly demands more before one can say it is satisfied.
A few months after Lantz, ASR was considered in Pierre, another fullcourt-reviewed decision. The IRS had determined gift tax liability as to transactions in which the taxpayer had transferred cash and securities to a single member LLC and later transferred her LLC interests to trusts. 107 The majority concluded that the LLC was not to be disregarded under the "check the box" entity classification regulations under § 7701, which was central to upholding the taxpayer's valuation of the interests.
108
The IRS failed to argue that its interpretation of the regulations was entitled to ASR deference, 109 In 2010, the full Tax Court decided Intermountain Insurance, another case involving the possibility of ASR deference. 117 This decision was part of a line of cases testing the validity of Treasury regulations extending the sixyear statute of limitations of § 6501(e) to tax understatements resulting from basis overstatements. Ultimately, a divided Supreme Court held the regulation to be invalid, thus resolving a sharp split among the lower federal courts.
118
In Intermountain Insurance, a majority of the Tax Court held against the IRS.
119 As relevant here, one of the issues was whether the regulations applied to the case at hand under their effective/applicability date provisions. The majority thought the regulations did not apply but chose not to rest its decision on that rationale alone. 120 The majority acknowledged the ASR principle but, based on a "plain meaning" analysis of the provisions, concluded that the IRS's view that the regulation did apply was "erroneous and inconsistent with the regulations."
121
The Intermountain Insurance majority invoked ASR by name but discredited it in substance. As we have seen, the Auer standard is whether the agency's interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." This high bar was not passed. The majority's "plain meaning" argument was not plainly right, indeed probably was not right at all. 122 The Halpern/Holmes concurrence convincingly dispatched the argument, 123 126 Id. at 378-80 & n.4. Three other judges agreed with this opinion. Judge Marvel, without opinion, concurred in the result only. Judges Halpern and Holmes filed a concurring opinion. Judge Thornton also wrote a concurring opinion, with which Judges Cohen, Halpern, Holmes, and Paris agreed. 127 Id. at 379 n.4. 128 Id. at 379-80 n.4 (quoting Wyo. Outdoor Council v. United States Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) ("Although the preamble does not 'control' the meaning of the regulation, it may serve as a source of evidence concerning contemporaneous agency intent."). 129 Id. It is not clear whether Judge Wherry, through this language, was trying to invoke the antiparroting exception. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62. Once that meaning has been determined, Chevron is considered to determine whether the regulation comports with the underlying statute.
130
The Halpern/Holmes and Thornton concurrences suggested that the case should have been resolved on the basis of the Tax Court's precedents holding the regulations invalid. They were right. Doing so would have avoided the dubious adventures in the Wherry opinion. 131 Later in 2011, the Tax Court decided NEA. 132 The issue in the case was how to calculate a labor union's unrelated business taxable income, and the outcome hinged on a regulation promulgated under § 512. Although eventually holding for the IRS, the court rejected ASR deference. The court, citing Auer and Lantz, recognized the deference principle; however, it was unable to apply it. 133 It was unclear that the IRS had in fact stated a position on the critical interpretation, or, if it had, what precisely that position was. 134 It appears that the court was correct in declining to afford ASR deference in NEA.
Evaluation
The Tax Court typically gives at least lip-service to ASR. Sometimes it even applies ASR deference faithfully, both in cases in which the IRS prevails and cases in which it justifiably should not. However, it is hard to escape the conclusion that, in the Tax Court, the ASR principle often is honored more in name than in substance.
ASR claims succeed in the Tax Court far less often than they do in the Supreme Court or even than they do in the federal district and circuit courts. This lesser effect is sometimes achieved in the Tax Court by use of bad doctrine. Examples of this include the court's adherence to a distorted notoriety element in cases like Southern Pacific and CSI. Other times, it is achieved by ungenerous application of good doctrine. Examples of this 130 See, e.g., Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993). 131 See Carpenter, 136 T.C. at 397-405 (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring) and at 405-06 (Thornton, J., concurring). 132 Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 137 T.C. 100 (2011). 133 Id. at 112-13. 134 Id. at 112-13 ("We cannot defer to a position that is not expressly articulated."). Moreover, one possible interpretation would have ignored the actual language of the regulation. Id. at 113.
include Tax Court judges' harsh, "hard look" 135 deployment of the "interpretation contrary to the regulation" exception in Lantz and Intermountain Insurance and of the "no settled agency position" exception in Pierre. The record is clear that the Tax Court applies ASR in a much less deferential spirit than do other federal courts.
B. Possible Explanations
This article has shown that the Tax Court accords less weight to the ASR principle than do other federal courts. What could explain this behavior? Below, four possibilities are considered: (1) advocacy gap, (2) experience gap, (3) concept of proper tax administration, and (4) taxspecialist versus generalist judicial orientation. It is possible that, with particular judges in particular cases, all of these may operate to a degree. However, the fourth explanation appears to be the most plausible and generally significant.
Advocacy Gap
Like adjudication in the United States generally, Tax Court litigation reflects the advocacy model more than the inquisitorial model. 136 Thus, to a meaningful extent, the Tax Court depends on the parties to identify and develop the issues that require judicial resolution. It may be that, as to the ASR principle, the Tax Court has not always been well served by the parties appearing before it.
Except in odd circumstances, 137 the government will be the party relying on ASR. The IRS Chief Counsel's Office represents the Commissioner in the Tax Court. Sometimes IRS Counsel fails to raise ASR when it could. 138 The Department of Justice represents the Commissioner in other courts. The two sets of government tax litigators sometimes approach similar cases differently. 139 In our context, the Department of Justice tends to be more accustomed to dealing with administrative law issues, and so may raise ASR more readily. 140 This bureaucratic difference, although real, would explain the frequent appearance of the issue in the various courts more than it would the nature of the treatment it receives when it appears. Thus, other causes should be sought.
Experience Gap
Deference is a branch of general administrative law. In the past, the tax community often tended towards insularity 141 and only slowly and grudgingly acknowledged the relevance of administrative law in tax controversies.
142
In decades gone by, some Tax Court cases addressed some administrative law issues 143 -but not often and, frankly, sometimes not very well. 144 Perhaps the Tax Court's out-of-step treatment of ASR deference reflected in part its limited experience with administrative law generally.
To the extent this ever was so, however, it is self-correcting. In the last fifteen years, there has been an explosion of litigation of administrative law issues in the Tax Court. In part, this has been because of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 ("RRA"). 145 RRA enacted a number of provisions-such as the spousal relief rules 146 and especially the collection due process rules 147 -that have raised unavoidable administrative law issues.
148 RRA also had an indirect effect in this direction. It established federal funding for low-income taxpayer clinics.
149
The consequent expansion of such clinics and their staffing has brought to the fore new corps of advocates who often have pressed administrative law issues in the Tax Court.
150
In addition, two other areas-unconnected with the RRA-have brought administrative law issues into sharper relief in the Tax Court. These areas are deference doctrine generally 151 and procedural challenges to the validity of Treasury regulations.
152 Deference doctrine generally is part of the explosion of Chevron-era case law and commentary. Increased procedural challenges to tax rules and regulations is inevitable as tax lawyers-slowly perhaps but inexorably-adjust to the "intrusion" of administrative law into tax law. Thus, whether it likes it or not, the Tax Court is being forced to confront administrative law issues more and more often. Whatever historical significance an experience gap may have had as an explanation for the Tax Court's unenthusiastic embrace of ASR, it is unlikely to operate powerfully in the future.
Concept of Tax Administration
Tax issues may be, or may be perceived to be, different from other types of issues in ways that make deference seem to be less justified. For instance, deference sometimes is thought to be more appropriate when agencies are engaged in policymaking than when they are engaged in purely technical administration.
153
Political legitimacy and accountability is part of the rationale articulated for Chevron deference. The Supreme Court stated:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency . . . . [F]ederal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones. "Our constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches." 154 Similar considerations also form part of the foundation for ASR deference. In its ASR decisions, the Supreme Court "has displayed the same concern with political accountability that underlay . . . Chevron."
155 Thus, in a 1980 non-tax case, the Court granted ASR deference to agency interpretation of regulations that involved "interstitial lawmaking." 156 In a 1991 case, the Court justified ASR deference in part on the fact that the agency's interpretation of its regulation could "entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns." 157 It is sometimes thought that the job of the Department of Treasury and the IRS is only to execute policy determined by Congress, not to formulate policy themselves. 158 One who views the missions of these agencies through this lens may find the case for ASR deference to be weaker as to tax agencies than as to more overtly policymaking agencies.
This view of tax agencies is reminiscent of a formerly robust notion of the role of "independent" federal agencies. This notion was reflected in the famous Humphrey's Executor case. 159 There the court described the Federal Tax Commission (emblematic of independent agencies) as "charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law. Its duties are neither political nor executive [and] its members are called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts." 160 In the decades since that decision, however, confidence in that conception has ebbed:
It is not as obvious today as it seemed in the 1930s that there can be such things as genuinely "independent" regulatory agencies, bodies of impartial experts . . . , or indeed, that the decisions of such agencies so clearly involve scientific judgment rather than political choice that it is even theoretically desirable to insulate them from the democratic process. early on accorded the tax agencies a great deal of interpretive freedom, ample space for making, not just implementing, policy. 162 In any event, that view is surely wrong now. The Department of the Treasury switched entity classification for tax purposes from a mandatory regime 163 to a substantially elective regime when it promulgated the checkthe-box rules. 164 Similarly, the Department of the Treasury writes the law governing consolidated income tax returns under an extremely loose congressional delegation. 165 These and numerous other examples make it clear that, today, the federal tax agencies do not just implement policy; they make policy. Some in the tax community may cling to a narrower conception of the proper role of the Department of the Treasury and the IRS, and give ASR less shrift as a result. If so, however, they invoke a "reality" that may never have existed and surely does not exist today.
Tax Specialist Versus Generalist Orientation
Having considered and discounted three possible explanations for weak ASR deference in the Tax Court, this article reaches a fourth and more plausible possible explanation. The Tax Court, as a tax-specialist tribunal, may be less readily disposed to deference claims than are the generalist federal courts.
Generalist judges-even those among the most illustrious-sometimes feel out of their depth when dealing with tax issues, a mood easily 1 1 2 0 1 3 | A u e r / S e m i n o l e R o c k D e f e r e n c For one not a specialist in this field to examine every tax question that comes before the Court independently would involve in most cases . . . an inquiry [entailing] weeks of study and reflection. Therefore, in construing a tax law it has been my rule to follow almost blindly accepted understanding of the meaning of tax legislation, when that is manifested by long-continued, uniform practice, unless a statute leaves no admissible opening for administrative construction. 166 Similarly, Judge Learned Hand stated (arguably with overmuch modesty):
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax . . . merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception-couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time. I know that these monsters are the result of fabulous industry and ingenuity . . . ; yet at times I cannot help recalling a saying of William James about certain passages of Hegel: that they were no doubt written with a passion of rationality; but that one cannot help wondering whether to the reader they have any significance save that the words are strung together with syntactical correctness. 167 In contrast, Congress created the Tax Court 168 as a specialized court 169 in part to provide greater expertise in tax cases. 170 And, of course, the Tax Court does that. Most of its judges were tax attorneys before their elevation to the bench, and many had positions of responsibility in federal tax 166 170 See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("I still think the Tax Court is a more competent and steady influence toward a systematic body of tax law than our sporadic omnipotence in a field beset with invisible boomerangs.").
agencies or congressional tax staffs. 171 The Tax Court's specialized docket-consisting of only tax cases-reinforces that knowledge and experience.
172
Tax Court judges often-indeed usually-have greater tax experience and knowledge than the IRS Counsel attorneys arguing the cases before them (although, of course, the positions taken by such counsel have, in all substantial cases, been coordinated with Counsel's National Office). The seed of deference is unlikely to germinate in such soil.
Indeed, most judges of the Tax Court fought a rear-guard action against Chevron deference in Tax (especially as to general-authority regulations) until they were dragged along by generalist appellate courts. For example, in the 2006 Swallows Holding case, a majority of the Tax Court invalidated a general-authority regulation under § 882. 173 Instead of Chevron, the majority applied as the controlling standard the pre-Chevron National Muffler case.
174 Three dissenting opinions were filed, 175 and the Third Circuit properly reversed the majority's holding on appeal. 176 The issue was not put to rest until 2011 when the Supreme Court held that Chevron displaced the seemingly more rigorous National Muffler standard even as to general-authority regulations.
177
Why this foot-dragging? The famous Chevron "two step" directs a court to determine, first, whether the statute is ambiguous, and second, if it is, whether the agency's interpretation is "permissible."
178 A permissible interpretation need not be the only or even the best possible construction; it need only be a reasonable construction.
179 Thus, inherent in Chevron is the notion that a statute may have more than one acceptable meaning.
A less pluralistic concept of law and meaning appeared to animate some Tax Court decisions. 180 Thus, opposition to Chevron-and, by association, opposition to other deference doctrines like ASR-may be anachronistic: "a relic of the pre-Chevron days, when there was thought to be only one 'correct' interpretation of a . . . text."
181 Tax Court judges inclined to seek a single "true" meaning of a tax statute or regulation-and who see themselves equal to the IRS in this mission of discovery-may find deference uncomfortable.
III. WHOSE VIEW IS BETTER?
This article has shown that the Tax Court is less inclined to accord ASR deference than are other federal courts, certainly much less than the Supreme Court. With whom walks wisdom? Below, this article considers 176 For arguments against the holding and reasoning of the Swallows Holding majority, see Steve R. Johnson both the justifications asserted for ASR deference and the objections offered against it. The conclusion is that the disadvantages are stronger than the advantages. ASR deference is a dubious rule of law. Accordingly, the Tax Court's reluctance seems more soundly based than the Supreme Court's enthusiasm. This part ends, however, on a cautionary note involving legitimacy.
A. Justifications
Numerous rationales for ASR deference have been offered by courts and commentators. They cluster into three areas: (1) the notion that the agency wrote the regulation, so it is best positioned to say what it means, (2) a set of ideas about the institutional roles of agencies and courts, and (3) complementary policy benefits. These are considered below. This article concludes that the asserted justifications have only limited force.
1. "They Wrote It, So They Best Know What It Means" This has been the most important of the proffered justifications, because it seems to possess obvious common-sense appeal. One would think that the agency that wrote the regulations is in "a better position . . . to reconstruct the purpose of the regulations" than anyone else.
182 Indeed, it is sometimes thought that ASR deference should be even broader than Chevron deference "because in the latter case the agency is addressing [the legislature's] intentions, while in the former it is addressing its own."
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Others find this only "a weak justification":
[i]n many cases, the interpretation at issue was announced so long after the rule was issued that it is unlikely the agency decisionmakers who issued the interpretation played any role in the decisionmaking process that led to the issuance of the rule. Moreover, most courts . . . confer [ASR] deference . . . even when the agency changes it interpretation, as long as the agency acknowledges that it is making a change and gives plausible reasons for the change. Moreover, those (like the author of this article) who incline towards textual approaches to interpretation cannot warmly embrace this rationale. The textualist asks not "what was the subjective intent of the author of this legal command" but "what objective intent does the document manifest in its language, structure, and context." 185 The "they wrote it, they know it best" justification is a purely subjective approach.
Were subjective intent the touchstone for interpretation, presumably courts would receive testimony from legislators as to what the legislature meant when it drafted and enacted a statute. But Anglo-American law has rejected that approach since Blackstone at least, 186 and courts overwhelmingly continue to reject it today. 187 
Institutional Roles
This cluster of arguments revolves around the idea that courts should respect the role of agencies and recognize the realities within which agencies operate. This includes both separation-of-powers and pragmatic strands. Although he did not endorse it, one commentator described the idea: "Viewed in isolation, [ASR] may be an understandable reaction to the exigencies of modern regulatory governance; it cuts agencies helpful interpretive slack in a world in which life is short, resources are limited, and agencies must address complex issues that have unpredictable twists and turns." 188 The Court has defended ASR deference on the ground that it reflects "sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches" of our government. 189 An important part of that, of course, is the familiar argument that agencies, by virtue of their greater technical expertise, have a comparative advantage over the courts in determining the needs of regulation. 190 Courts should respect the role of agencies, no doubt. But courts have their own constitutional responsibilities as well; to act as the ultimate arbitrators of what the law means. 191 At some point, cutting an agency slack to do its job becomes abdication by the court of its job. Accordingly, "balancing the necessary respect for an agency's knowledge, expertise, and constitutional office with the courts' role as interpreter of laws can be a delicate matter." 192 Moreover, one may ask why these standard incantations justify the super-deference that the Supreme Court has extended under ASR. They are no more potent "in the context of agency interpretation of agency rules than in the context of agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes, agency policy decisions, or agency findings of fact." 193 These other contexts are governed by standards of review which yield pro-agency results far less frequently than ASR. 194 Super-deference is not justified by these rationales. This is particularly the case as to the Tax Court. Generalist judges know less about tax law and administration than do IRS officials. But the Tax Court is a specialized expert tribunal whose judges typically had extensive tax careers (often with the IRS) before appointment and have dockets composed exclusively of tax cases. 195 The comparative advantage institutional argument is no reason for ASR deference in the Tax Court.
Policy Benefits
Justice Scalia noted that among the "undoubted advantages to [ASR] deference" is that "[i]t makes the job of a reviewing court much easier."
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Perhaps this is true, but there are higher responsibilities for courts than looking to their ease.
More significantly, an often voiced argument involves uniformity and predictability of the law. Specifically, [s] ince an agency's jurisdiction is national and a circuit court's jurisdiction is regional, a high degree of judicial deference to agency rules furthers the goal of maximizing national uniformity in implementing national statutes. Conversely, a low degree of deference would reduce national uniformity, since circuit courts are likely to adopt differing interpretations of agency rules.
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Once again, however, this consideration is not unique. " [I] t is no stronger in the context of agency interpretations of agency rules than in the context of agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes,"
198 so it does not justify a rule of super-deference. Moreover, this consideration applies with greater force with respect to geographically bounded federal district and circuit courts than with respect to the Tax Court, which has nationwide jurisdiction and was created to promote national uniformity in application of the tax laws. the agency effectively has the power of self-interpretation." 205 What is wrong with that? Manning answers:
This authority permits an agency to supply the meaning of regulatory gaps or ambiguities of its own making and relieves the agency of the cost of imprecision that it has produced. This state of affairs makes it that much less likely that an agency will give clear notice of its policies either to those who participate in the rulemaking process prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 206 or to the regulated public. The present arrangement also contradicts a major premise of our constitutional scheme and of contemporary separation of powers case law-that a fusion of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially dangerous to our liberties. 207 This critique has gained traction. A number of judges and courts have found it persuasive. 208 Justice Scalia reworked the argument thusly, stating, "When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the implementation of an executive agency, it has lost no control over that implementation . . . . The legislative and executive functions are not combined." 209 In contrast, "when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule's meaning." 210 Furthermore, though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.
Moving from constitutional first principles to doctrinal particulars, Justice Scalia concluded:
Deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes; the vagueness effectively cedes power to the Executive. By contrast, deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjucations, to do what it pleases. This frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary government.
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This concern is carefully reasoned and intriguing. However, it is not unquestionable. It makes a theoretical case, but "the proof of the pudding is in the eating." If agencies have an incentive under ASR to behave strategically, are they in fact doing so? Proof of that fact is needed.
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Arguably such proof was present in the Talk America context. 214 However, it is doubtful that the Department of Treasury and the IRS engage in such strategic behavior with appreciable frequency. The tax agencies repeatedly stress that they issue regulations and rulings to provide guidance to assist taxpayers in governing their affairs.
In addition, the Manning/Scalia concern is undercut by the antiparroting exception. As noted previously, ASR deference does not attach when the regulation merely repeats the language of the statute. 216 This limits the agency's ability to issue a wholly vacuous regulation in order to preserve maximum room for subsequent maneuver. To avoid the exception, the agency must go "beyond the language of the statute by particularizing or clarifying the statutory language to some significant but uncertain extent." 217 This consideration does not wholly defuse the Manning/Scalia concern. Theoretically, an agency could still use notice-and-comment procedure to promulgate "a broadly worded rule that contains many ambiguities, as long as the rule clarifies or particularizes the statutory language to the extent necessary to avoid the 'parroting' characterization. The agency could then use the interpretive process to make most important decisions."
218 Although this theoretical window of strategic opportunity exists, it would be risky for an agency to try to crawl through it. It would be a delicate calculation to assess just where the antiparroting exception ends, and thus, where the range of maximum strategic opportunity begins. An agency that made too aggressive or optimistic an estimate would wind up losing ASR deference.
Tax-Specific Objections
In addition to general objections to ASR deference, several concerns are particular to the tax context. First, no taxpayer is liable for tax unless some law affirmatively makes her liable. Typically, such "law" is a statute. In some instances, by virtue of delegated authority, a Treasury regulation may be such law in the sense that it defines or provides a predicate condition triggering the liability established by statute. But it would be an uncomfortable stretch to allow such law to be an interpretation of an unclear regulation. Tax liability should not be "imposed upon the citizen 216 See supra text accompanying notes 61-62. 217 Pierce & Weiss, supra note 12, at 518. 218 Id. at 518-19. it, 226 and many others have applied instead what amount to pro-IRS canons of construction. 227 Broadly speaking, a pendulum has swung in our tax history. When limited-government values are in the ascendancy, courts trot out the protaxpayer canon. When international or domestic crises make activist government appear necessary, the canon recedes in the reported cases. 228 After the 1940s, the principle largely disappeared from the federal decisions, except in occasional decisions from the Court of Claims, its successors, and the Sixth Circuit. 229 About a decade ago, two opinions in a Supreme Court case asserted the continuing vitality of the pro-taxpayer canon, 230 but it has not been prominent in subsequent case law. 231 If the pro-taxpayer canon exists and has vitality, 232 it and ASR deference operate at cross purposes. In cases of ambiguity, one can favor the taxpayer or one can favor Treasury and the IRS. One cannot favor both the taxpayer and the tax agencies.
overtly. The Tax Court's campaign against ASR deference, if that description is fair, has been guerilla, not conventional, warfare.
CONCLUSION
Speaking of ASR, a recent circuit court case observed that "deferential review is not inconsequential."
238 One could be forgiven for thinking that, in Tax Court ASR cases, "deferential review is not deferential."
This article has shown that, in federal courts generally and in the Supreme Court especially, agencies prevail at a high rate when they assert ASR. That is not true in the Tax Court, where ASR claims lose more often than they succeed. That is not accidental. A variety of factors, including the nature of tax cases and differences between subject-matter specialist and generalist courts, interact to produce these disparate outcomes.
What are we to make of this normatively? The Tax Court might be taken to task for judicial insubordination; for applying ASR-surely knowingly-in a more restrictive fashion than the teaching of the Supreme Court would countenance. The Tax Court could perhaps be defended against such an accusation based on contextual differences: the "tax versus non-tax" and "specialist versus generalist" explanations for the discrepancy.
Alternatively, the Tax Court might be defended on the ground that it is right and the Supreme Court is wrong. ASR is an unwise principle of law. Its harms exceed its benefits, and the doctrine should be abrogated. The Tax Court's hostility to ASR may sound in that realization. If, as occasional rumblings inspire hope for, the Supreme Court may ultimately downgrade or dispense with ASR deference, it may be that the Tax Court is less insubordinate than prescient.
